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ABSTRACT
Recent literature on comparative judicial politics reveals a variety of roles that courts
adopt in the process of democratization. These include, very rarely, serving as a trigger
for democratization, and more commonly, serving as downstream guarantor for departing
autocrats or as downstream consolidator of democracy. In light of these roles, this essay
reviews six relatively recent books: Courts in Latin America, edited by Helmke and RiosFigueroa (2011); Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from
Chile, by Hilbink (2007); Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in
Latin America, edited by Couso, Huneeus and Sieder (2011); The Legacies of Law: LongRun Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa, 1652–2000, by Meierhenrich
(2008); Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990–2006, by Trochev
(2008); and New Courts in Asia, edited by Harding and Nicholson (2010).
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INTRODUCTION
The past generation has seen two great trends in much of the developing world:
democratization and judicialization. A rapidly expanding comparative literature on courts
focuses on the intersection of these trends, applying diverse methodologies to a wide
array of new contexts. This essay reviews several key contributions to the burgeoning
corpus, focusing specifically on the roles of courts in democratization and in democratic
politics more broadly. The roles of courts depend, of course, on many contextual and
strategic factors. Fortunately, we are beginning to accumulate a sufficient body of case
studies to make some broad comparative generalizations.
I argue that the growing literature has great potential to expand our thinking about
the relationship between democracy and law, particularly outside the relatively stable
North American and Western European contexts that have informed most theorizing to
date. In more unstable environments, courts find themselves in more risky positions, but
also may be called upon to perform essential governance functions when other
institutions are weak or ineffective. These courts thus may have more constraints but also
more opportunities for innovation than do their counterparts in stable democratic
environments. Instability requires careful consideration of the role of time, as judicial
power can ebb and flow in response to particular circumstances.
In addition, thinking about courts from a broader governance perspective—as
“one governing institution among many” (Shapiro 1964, 6)—shifts the focus away from
abstract theory of what courts should do and toward empirical evaluation of what courts
actually do. This is particularly important in transitional situations. While the normative
literature on law, under the rubric of the countermajoritarian difficulty, has tended to treat
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democracy and judicial power as in some tension, casual empiricism suggests that
democratization has been accompanied or paralleled by judicialization in many countries,
including the creation of many new courts and the empowerment of old ones. This has
led to a new diversity in the domains in which courts are active, with many new roles and
approaches.
This essay reviews several recent contributions to the comparative literature on
courts. Three are single-country monographs that use a longitudinal approach: Hilbink’s
Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile, which seeks
to understand why Chile’s judiciary was so quiescent both during and after Pinochet’s
dictatorship; Meierhenrich’s Legacies of Law, which traces South African law before,
during, and after the apartheid era; and Trochev’s Judging Russia: Constitutional Court
in Russian Politics 1990–2006, which examines the life and sometimes death of three
institutions charged with constitutional adjudication in the Soviet Union and Russia. Two
are edited volumes that seek to document the more prominent role of courts in Latin
America, which has undergone a wave of democracy in recent decades. Cultures of
Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America, edited by Couso,
Huneeus, and Sieder, emphasizes the role of ideas and non-strategic action. Courts in
Latin America, edited by Helmke and Rios-Figueroa, uses an explicitly strategic lens,
while not completely jettisoning the role of ideas (e.g., p. 17). The two collections focus,
implicitly rather than explicitly, on the period of democratic consolidation. Finally, New
Courts in Asia, edited by Harding and Nicholson, brings together a diverse set of case
studies from that region. (I should disclose that I have a chapter in this volume.)
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Together, these books provide a very rich set of studies about the growth of judicial
power in several regions of the world.1
In the discussion that follows, I emphasize the concept of the roles of courts in the
broader political and social system as being crucial for understanding courts in fragile
environments. The more conventional approach is to frame the inquiry in terms of
judicial empowerment (Hirschl 2004; Ginsburg 2003) or judicial independence
(Peerenboom 2010). These are useful concepts in some contexts, and, assuming that
measurement issues can be overcome, are a sound basis for cross-national research. But
as scholars working on these concepts have well recognized, the power or independence
of a court can vary widely by issue area, case type, the identity of the parties, and
especially across time (Kapiszewski et al. forthcoming). The particular configuration of
exercised power along these parameters constitutes the role of the court.
The concept of roles is broader and less normatively laden than the notion of
power or independence. Judicial power is, in our rule-of-law-obsessed world, sometimes
treated as an end in itself, and judicial independence is sometimes emphasized at the
expense of judicial accountability (cf. Kosar forthcoming). The concept of role does not
make implicit normative assumptions about the optimal level of judicial power. Judges
might in theory play various roles: gadfly or scapegoat, regime supporter or opponent,
protector of minorities or tool of majority rule. The only assumptions are that judges find
themselves confronted with different problems, audiences, and constraints in different
contexts, and have some ability to shape their own role in response.
To organize the discussion of the books under I am considering, I apply a
temporal categorization, analyzing the role of courts at different stages of the
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democratization process. The analysis includes courts in authoritarian regimes,
transitioning democracies and more established democracies. Examining the trajectory of
judicial roles at different times allows us to inductively generate insights about judicial
choices as well as the factors that constrain them.
THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE
Let us begin with the status quo ante: an authoritarian regime. While scholars
have traditionally assumed that courts play no role in such contexts, this assumption was
badly mistaken. Regime-supportive roles do exist in authoritarian settings. Trochev
(2008, 6) makes the point concisely: “rulers—regardless of their authoritarian or
democratic pedigree—create and tolerate new constitutional courts as long as the latter:
(a) provide important benefits for the new rulers, and (b) do not interfere too much with
public policies.”
What are the “important benefits” that courts might provide? Moustafa (2007;
Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008) categorized a series of roles that courts can play in such
regimes. These include (1) establishing social control and sidelining political opponents,
(2) bolstering a regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy, (3) strengthening administrative
compliance within the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and solving coordination
problems among competing factions within the regime, (4) facilitating trade and
investment, and (5) implementing controversial policies so as to allow political distance
from core elements of the regime. An increasingly rich literature grapples with these roles
in a wide array of authoritarian contexts (Barros 2003 on Chile; Brown 1997 on the Arab
world; Mazmanyan 2010 on the post-Soviet world; Moustafa 2007 on Egypt; Pereira
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2005 on Latin America; Solomon 1996 on Russia). The literature demonstrates a
surprisingly diverse set of regime-enhancing roles.
For example, as documented by Connie Carter (2010) in her contribution to New
Courts in Asia, China established specialized benches and divisions within the court
system when confronted with international pressure to improve protection of intellectual
property rights. This was part of an overall policy of enhancing judicial capacity in
China, in this case to facilitate trade and investment. Pittman Potter’s account of courts in
Xinjiang in the same volume shows how the Chinese regime uses courts to implement
vital policies of social control and economic development in a very sensitive geographic
area. These examples show that courts are used instrumentally, subject to shifting
demands of policymakers, and yet are increasingly important to authoritarian governance.
Yet not all attempts by authoritarians to use courts are effective. Penelope Nicholson’s
analysis of the Vietnamese economic court shows an institution that has not developed an
effective reputation for dispute resolution, and is marginalized both by users and the
government. It has not been able to shape its environment to any significant degree.
Both Trochev and Meierhenrich focus on a single context over a long period and
emphasize the historical institutionalist approach to courts (Gillman 1999; Graber 2006).
Both studies are very helpful for understanding temporal dynamics, Trochev covers three
different institutional periods: the establishment of the Committee for Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR from 1988 to 1991; the first Russian Constitutional Court,
which sat from 1992 to October 1993, when it was suspended by President Yeltsin; and
the second Russian Constitutional Court, reconstituted under the December 1993
Constitution, which has operated continuously since then. The creation of the Committee

6

for Constitutional Supervision under Gorbachev in 1988 seems to be adequately
explained in the authoritarian framework by functionalist needs to discipline lower-level
administrative agencies and to clear the legal system of pre-reform laws that blocked
Gorbachev’s perestroika program.2 When we move to the creation of the first Russian
Constitutional Court in 1991, however, historical contingency seems to play a greater
role. Trochev describes the careful maneuvering of legal elites and their ability to frame
the court as a constraint on, alternatively, the parliament, the president, and the justice
agencies. Rule-of-law rhetoric played an important role, and the dissolution of the USSR
as the Court was being set up provided opportunities for political elites to tinker with the
Court for their own short-term ends. We thus have a highly contingent account, and one
cannot read the Court as serving any particular set of strategic elites, save perhaps the
lawyers who sought its creation. Within a year, however, the Court successfully lobbied
for amendments expanding its jurisdiction, shaping its operating environment.
The search for more strategic space in which to work can motivate judicial
expansion. A common theme of analyses of courts in authoritarian settings is that courts
serve regime interests, even as they facilitate the expression of opposition in some
contexts. Courts are not exclusively a tool, but rather a forum that is established for
strategic reasons, with the potential to facilitate activities that undermine the regime. This
“two-sided” feature (Moustafa 2007) may disincentivize the use of courts in some
circumstances, or be thought of as a necessary price or even costly signal in other
contexts.
Meierhenrich’s account of South African law from its inception, through the
creation of the authoritarian apartheid regime 1948–61, and eventually through
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democratization in the 1990s, highlights this feature of courts. Law, he argues, “was
sword and shield in South Africa” (p. 129). Drawing on Ernst Fraenkel’s (1941) notion of
the dual state, he shows that law was a tool of prerogative power but also a source of
normative constraint on the regime. In the 19th century, law played a role in liberal
constraint of the state, and legal positivism served as a force for state-building in the early
20th century. As apartheid emerged in full force in the middle of the 20th century, it relied
extensively on law to effectuate oppressive practices, even as courts continued to
constrain the regime at its outer edges. For example, the regime responded to adverse
rulings by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court by packing the bench and
limiting its jurisdiction. The dual character of law as both constraining and empowering
government is artfully demonstrated in Meierhenrich’s book.
The availability of courts to regime opponents makes it possible to think of courts
playing a role in facilitating democratization of authoritarian states. Let us first
distinguish upstream roles from downstream roles in democracy. Upstream roles are
those that occur before democratization is a accomplished. They consist of activities
either in the authoritarian setting or in the early phases of gradual transitions.
Downstream roles are those that occur once democratization has become irreversible,
even if not complete. We can distinguish two alternative scenarios for each phase:
upstream, courts can serve primarily as instruments of repression or as upstream triggers
for democratization; downstream, courts can serve as guarantors of authoritarian position
and privilege or as democratic consolidators, in which courts follow the initial decision to
democratize and facilitate the process in various ways. A final possibility at either phase
is judicial irrelevance, in which courts play no discernible role, either as guarantors,
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triggers, or consolidators. With this framework in mind, let us examine the evidence
presented by the recent literature.
UPSTREAM TRIGGERS OF DEMOCRACY
In very rare instances, courts play a central role triggering democratization when
the autocrat is not seeking to withdraw, but is confronted by a rising opposition. In these
situations, courts are in fact at the center of the transition decision. These are situations of
conflict and contingency, in which democratization is not yet the only feasible outcome.
The role of the court decision is to serve as a focal point around which activists mobilize
(Weingast 1997; see also Law 2008). In these models, a ruler conspires with some
citizens to dominate other citizens, using a combination of repression and selective
incentives for regime insiders. The dominated group can be very large, but can only limit
the ruler if it can coordinate to overturn the narrow ruling coalition. Coordination is very
difficult to achieve, because citizens may not agree on what exactly constitutes a
violation of the rules, and may not know whether other citizens will join in an effort to
take power. Any subset of citizens thinking of rising up to challenge the regime can only
succeed if others join them. Otherwise, the opponent ends up in jail—or worse—and the
regime maintains power. The contrast between the 2011 democratic revolts in Egypt and
Syria illustrates the stakes. Since any particular citizen is uncertain as to what other
citizens will do, the prospective mobilizers will likely stay quiescent and authoritarianism
will be sustained. Only when there is agreement on what constitutes a violation and
mutual expectations that citizens will in fact enforce the rules will democracy emerge and
be sustained.
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To achieve coordination requires focal points (Schelling 1960, 57). The particular
focal points that will allow citizens to find ways to overcome their collective action
problem are not obvious ex ante, and are not uniform across all times and places. Indeed,
a constructivist approach that takes social reality as partially constructed by groups and
individuals may be helpful to illuminate why particular messages and frames become
effective focal points. Yet there are also institutional reasons why a court decision can
serve as a focal point for citizens to coordinate their efforts against the regime.
Why might citizens focus on a court decision? First, a court decision against the
government can provide clarity as to what constitutes a violation of the rules. Lacking an
authoritative pronouncement, regime opponents might disagree about whether a violation
occurred and may thus fail to coordinate to enforce the rules. By creating common
knowledge that a violation of the rules has occurred, a court decision can help citizens to
overcome the collective action problem. Second, a court decision against the government
is an information transmission device, communicating the view that the government
apparatus is not completely unified on policy. It also indicates, at a minimum, that judges
do not believe their personal safety is in jeopardy from challenging regime rules, and this
may allow opponents to update their own assessments of the risks of challenge. Third, a
court decision is a resource that can be used by activists to rally supporters to their cause;
it legitimates regime opposition and raises the costs of repression. A regime that arrests
citizens after an unfavorable court decision will suffer greater reputational loss than it
would before that decision. This is not to say that the court decision guarantees
implementation—only that it can facilitate mobilization by raising the marginal costs of
repression.
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Publicity and transparency are unifying factors in the judicial ability to produce
clarity about violations, to generate information on tensions within the regime, and to
raise the cost of repression. It is the public, broadly transmitted nature of court decisions
that allow them to serve as focal points. But of course publicity is not a given; regimes
can influence the publicity given to court decisions through both formal and informal
means.
In sum, the incentives for courts to produce “trigger” decisions are not obvious ex
ante. Courts have an institutional incentive to ensure that their decisions are implemented
rather than ignored, which requires predicting that citizens will actually respond to calls
for change. Attempting to provide a focal point for regime opposition carries grave
institutional risks in the event that the citizenry does not ultimately back enforcement of
the decision. The regime can respond in myriad ways to punish the courts. We should
expect, then, that courts will engage in providing focal points only when they have strong
institutional and political links to outside institutions that can defend them from
punishment, or are sufficiently confident for other reasons that their decisions will be
implemented. These conditions are not always present.
Gretchen Helmke’s (2004) notion of “strategic defection” provides one set of
conditions in which we might see the courts being willing to provide such focal points.
Helmke focuses on highly unstable institutional environments (Argentina in particular),
where new governments come in with some frequency and typically change the
composition of the high courts when they do. In such places, argues Helmke, “the
relevant inter-temporal conflict of interest shifts from the standard scenario of a judge
appointed by a past government who is primarily constrained by a current government, to
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a more uncertain situation in which a judge appointed by the current government faces
potential constraints at the hands of a future opposition government” (p. 13). Under such
circumstances, judges may start to rule against the current government as soon as it
begins to weaken so as to preserve their position under a future regime. Judicial decisions
in such circumstances provide information to the opposition about the imminence of
decline, and thus can help to facilitate anti-regime coordination. Beyond signaling, such
defection provides institutional resources for regime opponents through supportive
decisions, and makes judicial independence a political issue around which to organize.
One example of judges playing a triggering role occurred during the “Orange
Revolution” in the Ukraine of 2004–2005 (see generally Trochev forthcoming). President
Kuchma had sought to use his position to promote the candidacy of his chosen successor
Viktor Yanukovych. Using a variety of methods, including seeking to poison the
opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, the government rigged the results of a run-off
election in November 2004. Yushchenko’s supporters refused to accept the results, and
he held a symbolic inauguration. He also gathered a set of resolutions from local
governments promising support. His supporters initiated widespread protests and
demonstrations, as well as a court case seeking to annul the election results. In addition,
the parliament voted no confidence in Yanukovych, who was serving as prime minister.
Dramatically, on December 3, 2004, the supreme court resolved the immediate political
deadlock when it ordered a re-vote for the presidential election later that month. Held
under intense international scrutiny, Yushchenko won the second election handily and the
court dismissed Yanukovych’s various legal challenges. The court was thus at the center
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of forcing a change in power, providing the capstone to a broad movement and turning
back continued dictatorship.
The decision at least appeared to serve as a trigger because of its temporal
proximity to broader efforts at social mobilization. The Ukrainian decision emboldened
the opposition and buried the regime. The court did not pick the leader directly, but was
involved in structuring political competition to ensure that the choice was made in a
transparent manner, providing an opportunity for the opposition forces to exploit. This
illustrates, again, one of the themes of how courts can assist with democratization:
holding the regime to its nominal promises and providing fora for political forces to
pursue their agendas. While the independent power of courts is open to debate—at least
some analysts believed that the court acted only after the major political forces had
reached a consensus that a new election was the appropriate course—it is clear that it
played a major role. Counterfactually, without the court decision in the electoral cases,
the outcome may have been very different.3
More often, however, attempts to provide focal points may trigger a backlash.
Moustafa’s (2007) account of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in dealing with
Mubarak’s regime provides one illustration. The Court, empowered to enforce
administrative discipline and to signal to foreigners the credibility of property rights,
engaged in a series of increasingly bold decisions that challenged government policies.
But when the Court started to give an ear to political opponents of the regime, it had its
jurisdiction restructured, and key appointments were made to ensure a pro-government
line.
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This framework provides an interesting lens to consider Trochev’s story of the
first Russian Constitutional Court, which sat from 1992 to October 1993. It was then
suspended by President Yeltsin as a result of his confrontation with the former
communist party in the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR), which
involved the shelling of parliament. When Court Chairman Valery Zorkin organized the
judges to sit all night to condemn Yeltsin’s action as unconstitutional, he set the Court on
confrontation with what was perhaps destined to be a strong-executive system. Might
Russia today be a different place had the Court decision provided a focal point for a
popular reaction against Yeltsin? One can only speculate, though the ultimate emergence
of the Putin phenomenon suggests that the upstream trigger role would never have
worked.
The broader strategic account of judicial behavior suggests that there will be an
ongoing dialogue or interaction between courts and political branches. In equilibrium,
courts will never overstep the boundaries of what is politically feasible, but of course in
the real world, we should expect occasional mistakes. Courts may lack good information
on the intentions of the authoritarian regime. For example, if courts have been
empowered to provide credible commitments to foreign investors, they may rule against
the government even in cases that the government feels very strongly about—provoking a
curtailing of judicial power. Another factor that tends to mitigate against anti-government
tendencies are the relatively high institutional stakes in an authoritarian setting. Courts
may be extra cautious when the consequences are not only institutional but may spill over
into personal safety (Widner 2008).
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In sum, there are many reasons that we should not expect courts to be at the very
forefront of democratization. In very rare cases, courts may make crucial decisions that
turn out to be focal points for broader oppositional coalitions to mobilize. In such
moments the court decision can become the moment at which regime change coalesces.
But court decisions are neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic transition to occur.
And a historical review suggests such moments do not often occur.
DOWNSTREAM GUARANTORS
A more common scenario occurs when the authoritarian regime seeks to withdraw
from active involvement in politics rather than maintain power indefinitely. This may be
typical of some coup-makers, or a regime which relied on a short-term emergency to
justify repressive policies. It may also be a rational decision once a regime realizes it
cannot survive. In such cases, the autocrat faces the problem of guaranteeing that his or
her core policies will not be overturned after a transition back to majoritarian rule. The
autocrat may also be concerned with the property and liberty of his supporters, who are
likely threatened by a change in power.
In this type of situation, the autocrat may seek to empower courts to act as
downstream guarantors of the bargain for exit, providing policy security after the dictator
goes. Hirschl (2004), writing in the context of industrial democracies, calls this function
“hegemonic preservation,” in which a declining powerful group uses courts to secure its
policies and limit downstream actors. Hirschl is normatively critical of this function,
suggesting that it hampers more progressive transformation. My version of this argument
(2003) focuses on minorities in general (which can include departing autocrats) and
suggests that courts provide political insurance to prevent policy reversal and minimize
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the risks of the future. This should not strictly speaking be seen as an anti-democratic
function—sometimes it can be necessary to induce the autocrat to give up power in the
first place. But the court plays a basically conservative role of preserving a bargain
against future disruption.
This scenario is only likely for certain kinds of transitions, typically gradual ones
in which the autocrat is able to write the rules of the game and negotiate the terms of exit.
Some accounts of Chile’s negotiated transition under Pinochet fit this account, in that
property rights and an institutional veto for the departing autocrats were entrenched into
the constitution (but see further discussion below). Turkey’s military-drafted 1982
Constitution seemed to contemplate a similar role for courts, which served to discipline
Islamist political parties for many years (Bâli 2012; Shambayati 2004, 2007) The
strategy of using courts to entrench policies is effective in a wide variety of settings, but
there is also no guarantee that it will be fully effective, particularly if courts are tainted as
instruments of the earlier regime. The classic account of French judicial politics traces
fear of gouvernement des juges back to the French revolution, in which the Magistrates
served as a reactionary force and thus could not guarantee even their own heads. The
judges’ political decision is believed to have continuing institutional consequences two
centuries later. One can imagine, however, an alternative French history in which the
judges induced the King to step down through guarantees that his property would remain
intact. In such an instance, French attitudes toward judges (and much else) might be
different. Whether the particular counterfactual story here is credible or not, the basic
point is that judges can serve democracy by upholding the rights of the former dictators,
because such institutional guarantees can induce resignation without revolution.
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Perhaps the paradigm example of courts serving as a downstream guarantor is
from South Africa, in which the National Party negotiated an extensive set of judicially
enforceable rights as a condition of turning over power to the black majority and the
African National Congress (ANC). As Hirschl (2002; 2004) argues, there was a “nearmiraculous conversion to constitutionalism and judicial review among South Africa’s
white political and business elites during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it became
clear that the days of apartheid were numbered and an ANC-controlled government
became inevitable.” For much of South Africa’s history, white elites had opposed the
creation of judicially created bills of rights, precisely because law would then serve as
more of a constraint than an instrument of oppression. But when it became clear that the
regime could not be maintained, the regime shifted views and drafted its own version of a
bill of rights. This was designed not only to preserve the rights of a prospective minority
in the face of near certain electoral loss but also, crucially, to preserve the economic
leverage of the elite (Meierhenrich 2008, 203–04). There would be inevitable pressures
for redistribution after the new majority took over; drafting a new constitution to secure
property rights and establishing a new constitutional court to monitor violations were
ways of entrenching the power and wealth of the old elite.
Crucially, the existence of a tradition of autonomous law that had operated even
during apartheid made it possible for the African National Congress to make a credible
commitment to the National Party (Meierhenrich 2008). Without a tradition of law, the
National Party might not have been willing to trust the new majority to uphold its
promises. But the existence of courts that upheld the law in the authoritarian phase, even
when it conflicted with the regime’s demands, made law a viable solution for the post-
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authoritarian commitment problem. The new constitutional court oversaw the transition,
even demanding changes in the final draft constitution to meet the requirements of the
Interim Constitution. To be sure, the constitutional court has played many other roles in
democratic transition (Klug 2003; Lollini 2010), helping to define the new order and to
incorporate global human rights discourse into the country. In this sense, it has also been
a vehicle of democratic consolidation. But it would arguably not have been created
without its ability to serve as a downstream guarantor of the bargain ending apartheid.
The core elements of this bargain—democratic rule in exchange for security of property
rights and limited transitional justice—have remained intact against great political
pressure, and the country’s courts have been part of the reason. This has led to criticisms,
to be sure, but all in all has garnered respect for the constitutional court. And it would not
have been possible without a long tradition of law as both sword and shield in the predemocratic period.
DOWNSTREAM DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATORS
In other times and places, courts may serve as instruments of the newly
democratic regime, becoming central to the process after the crucial moment occurs. In
these scenarios, the change from autocracy to democracy involves a removal of
constraints on the legal system, or in some cases affirmative empowerment of legal
actors. In these instances, the courts can become important sites of contestation between
elements of the old regime and new, devices for facilitating transitional justice, allies of
the new order, or systematic dismantlers of the legal infrastructure of the old regime. For
example, in post–World War II Italy, the transition from fascism was ambiguous, in that
the Italian position was that they had won the war and hence there was no push for a
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complete institutional overhaul. This left many of the old fascist statutes on the books. It
became the task of the constitutional court to work through challenges to these statutes
one at a time, cleaning the legal system of its fascist legacy. The Court’s role was
essentially one of building up its own power through cleaning up the legacies of
authoritarian rule. But the timing was one of follower rather than leader in
democratization.
To state the matter this way is not to assert that judges and law are unimportant to
democratic transitions. On the contrary, courts become crucial to structuring an
environment of open political competition, free exchange of ideas, and limited
government. It is only to point out that, in most instances, legal actors are not at the very
center of the transition decision, but rather are involved in the phase of consolidation. In
that phase, they can play a central role in ensuring accountability and transparency
(Gloppen et al. 2010).
Often (though not in the Italian case, since the Italian court was a new institution)
this scenario results from a reinvention of the judicial role after democratization.
Formerly quiescent institutions can become more powerful and capable should they
choose to do so, and skillful judges can adjust to the new era. Furthermore, as judicial
personnel change, they are likely to become more daring and to express the values of a
new era. It is not surprising, for example, that the South African negotiations called for
the creation of a new constitutional court, rather than relying on institutions affiliated
with apartheid. But in general, new elites lack the breadth and depth of personnel to staff
a full judiciary after transition, so that of necessity low-level judicial staff may remain
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who have been appointed by the previous regime. This can have significant downstream
effects at low levels of policy conflict, in which judges can hamper the new regime.
New courts are the central concern of the Harding and Nicholson volume (2010).
The creation of new courts provides an opportunity to understand the dynamics of
institutional design and the political motivations behind judicialization. Sometimes, as
described above, new courts are created because old courts are not trusted to carry out the
task because of either corruption, incompetence, or political inclination. Other times, the
old courts may not want the task. Special jurisdictions to fight corruption (in Indonesia
and the Philippines), to engage in administrative adjudication (Indonesia), and to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over previously immune royals (Malaysia) are all examples.
One very common move is to set up a new institution assigned the central task of
constitutional adjudication.4 Thailand’s Constitutional Court of 1997–2006, as described
in Andrew Harding’s chapter in his co-edited volume (2010), found itself playing a role
of resolving major political cases involving elections, corruption, and economic
regulation. In human rights cases, on the other hand, it was fairly deferential toward
government. The role of political adjudicator was a risky one, given the contentious state
of Thailand’s politics, and the Court found itself oscillating between the rising political
forces of Thaksin Shinawatra and the Bangkok elite. Oscillation turned out not to be a
good strategy, as the Court was ultimately disbanded following a coup in 2006. The mix
of cases that defines a court’s role, it turns out, has much to do with its ultimate success
or failure.
Understanding the type of case in which constitutional adjudicators have an
impact is the central problem for Helmke and Rios-Figueroa in their edited volume. Their
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chief axis is rights vs. structure: the extent to which constitutional courts are willing to
protect individual rights and the extent they are willing to arbitrate interbranch disputes in
the political system. These categories are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Some courts
in Latin America (e.g., the constitutional court in Costa Rica) have played an active role
in both rights adjudication and interbranch conflict; others (e.g., in Brazil and Mexico)
have focused more on the latter set of issues instead of individual claims; yet others (in
Colombia) focus primarily on rights.
Helmke and Rios’ synthetic introduction does not provide a theory of case
selection but does effectively interrogate other issues related to judicial power. One
theory drawn from the strategic literature that is squarely confirmed in the case studies is
what the editors label the fragmentation thesis: that judicial power expands with divided
politics. This is pursued through both longitudinal analysis and comparative approaches.
In Argentina, for example, Chavez, Ferejohn, and Weingast show that judicial
willingness to confront the government increased during periods of divided government
relative to periods in which it was unified. Scribner compares the Argentine and Chilean
courts to make the same point. Sanchez, Magaloni, and Magar analyze the Mexican
Supreme Court using Bayesian ideal point estimation techniques, surely one of the first
instances of this approach being used outside the United States.5
Role designation may be a crucial factor in determining when courts become
active. This is brought out in Wilson’s account of the Costa Rican Court’s creation of a
constitutional chamber in 1989, when it was hardly expected to emerge as the most
powerful and active court in the region. But the new chamber, created as a technical
improvement to the constitutional adjudication system rather than as a result of any drive
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for political insurance, took its designated and exclusive role seriously, abandoning
formalism and empowering new claims from various actors. As the party system
transformed, smaller political parties began to use constitutional adjudication to challenge
government policies, in turn strengthening the court. The phenomenon of judges who
were expected to be quiescent engaging in a broad spectrum of political issues goes to the
central issue of the self-articulation of the judicial role, and the ability of judges in certain
circumstances to greatly alter their operating environment.
It is not always advantageous to be a new institution. While new courts have the
advantage of a clearly defined role which can facilitate judicialization, they also may
become involved in conflicts with older courts that are jealous of their prerogatives.
Indeed, the idea of roles emphasizes that it is not just possible but likely that different
courts will assume different roles in the political and legal system—if one court is already
occupying a particular political space, the other may have to take an opposing view to
maintain relevance. Conflicts between supreme and constitutional courts have become
commonplace, as described for Indonesia (Hendrianto) and Korea (Ginsburg) in the
Harding and Nicholson volume. A supreme court may play a role of downstream
guarantor even while its counterpart constitutional court tries to play a transformative
role. Trochev, in a comparative chapter at the end of his volume, describes the conflicts
that have broken out between constitutional and supreme courts in various countries, as
each struggles to define its own role.
At the same time, institutional constraints besides the presence of other
adjudicative bodies will limit the ability to define a role clearly. The Supreme Federal
Tribunal of Brazil, for example, has a very wide jurisdiction but lacks docket control, and
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so has been flooded the court with as many as 160,000 cases a year (Brinks 2010, 135–
36). In addition, until 2004, it lacked any formal ability to establish a binding precedent.
These institutional constraints however are offset by wide political support from the
country’s presidents (Nunes 2010).
A related theme highlighted in these volumes is the lack of perfect correlation
between formal institutions and actual powers exercised by courts. The entire region has
gone through a wave of judicial reform designed to enhance the independence and
insulation of the constitutional judiciary, but these institutional reforms are not sufficient
to guarantee substantive independence. The gap between formal and actual levels of
power is perhaps best illuminated through the historical institutionalist or ideational
approaches. Institutional conceptions drift over time, and key interpretive junctures will
establish patterns that can persist, even through significant environmental change. In
addition, ideas and local cultures can play an important role in shaping how formal
institutions operate. In the case of Latin America, there is a significant contrast between
the highly unitary civil law positivism that is common to the formal legal histories of the
region and the actual legal pluralism that operates in practice. This gap surely shapes the
behavior of courts, high and low, and is a target of the Cultures of Legality volume,
which adopts a dynamic and plural notion of culture.
Another element that surely is relevant for understanding the Latin American
cases is the regional dimension. As the region has undergone a wave of democratization,
it has also developed norms to prevent backsliding. These were in evidence in the 2009
backlash against the “coup” in Honduras ousting President Manuel Zelaya. Zelaya was
part of the region’s turn toward populist leftism, and, like Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales,
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and Daniel Ortega, he sought to do away with term limits. The supreme court held that
his mere suggestion that a referendum might be held on the issue was sufficient to trigger
provisions in the Honduran constitution.
As a parenthetical matter, the term-limit issue is a good example of a repeated
issue across many contexts that gives us clues into the political role of courts and which
side they align themselves with (see generally Ginsburg et al. 2011). In Colombia, the
constitutional court rejected an attempt by Alvaro Uribe to bypass term limits through
constitutional referendum, thus arguably serving an important role in preserving political
competition. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, the supreme court held that term limits
were themselves unconstitutional. In the latter case, the court was clearly aligning itself
with Daniel Ortega’s populism; in the former, the court was playing a more systemic role.
The Costa Rican court issued two decisions on Oscar Arias’ attempt to argue that a 1969
constitutional amendment prohibiting reelection was a violation of liberties protected
under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights; in the first case, it rejected his
argument, but in the second, the constitutional chamber had a new membership and
upheld the argument, paving the way for Arias to resume the presidency in 2006 (Wilson
2011, 66–67).
What of the Honduran court? It seems to have been, from one perspective, an
example of hegemonic preservation or downstream guarantor. It helped ensure that the
conservative elites would not be pushed aside by a new rising competitor. But the
regional dimension came into play. The Organization of American States reacted quite
strongly, characterizing Zelaya’s forced removal in the middle of the night as a coup.
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Memories of military intervention thus affected the framing of the incident by external
actors, and this led to a long period of uncertainty in Honduran politics.
Interestingly, the Honduran story is not atypical in that the relationship between
national courts and international bodies is not always a happy one. Scholars of European
integration tend to emphasize the collaborative dynamic that developed between national
judges and the European Court of Justice, in which references to the regional body
empowered lower-court judges in national systems. In contrast, cooperative relations
between local judiciaries struggling for status and international bodies are not always the
norm in the developing world. Alexandra Huneeus, in her contribution to the Cultures of
Legality volume, describes a set of instances in which Latin American courts have
rejected rulings of the Inter-American Court. In Venezuela, this involved a local rejection
of an attempt by the Inter-American Court to defend judicial independence in the face of
Bolivarian politicization. The courts became the site of an explicitly political project, and
technocratic judges fired by populist leader Hugo Chavez were unable to retain their
seats. (The Inter-American Court was successful in a similar case involving Bolivia,
however, when President Morales falsely accused constitutional judges of taking bribes
(Castagnela and Pérez-Liñán, 299). In Chile, the Inter-American Court stepped into a
very delicate navigation of transitional justice by calling for invalidation of the 1978
Amnesty Decree, which had been used by General Augusto Pinochet to absolve the
military for the 1973 coup. In other words, the regional court rejected the role of
downstream guarantor for the local judiciary. Huneeus (133) emphasizes the desire of
Chilean judges to retain control of and take credit for the prosecutorial turn in Chilean
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politics. In her account, role conception and cultural factors are central to understanding
court behavior in these instances.
The two Latin America volumes thus emphasize different aspects of the
expansion of judicial power in Latin America during the democratic era. Helmke and
Figueroa emphasize that the new democratic environment is one that throws up novel
cases. Often constitutional allocations of powers are incomplete and unclear, and there is
a need for an institution to resolve various political conflicts among branches of
government. So one consolidation role can be to serve as the proverbial third party to
adjudicate interbranch conflicts over powers. The Couso et al. volume, on the other hand,
provides a more thorough account of why we observe such an increase in rights
adjudication in the region, particularly the role of courts in delivering on socio-economic
rights (Gauri and Brinks 2008). The role of ideas, framing and constructivism is moved to
the fore. For example, Rueda’s chapter in Cultures of Legalityapplies a linguistic
approach to argue that the Colombian constitutional court’s articulation of an
unenumerated right to minimo vital, or subsistence minimum. In the early years, this was
framed as a right available to defenseless individuals, but it gradually expanded the scope
of protection to new classes of vulnerable people, eventually becoming a general social
and economic right available to the middle class after an economic crisis. This involved a
careful development of a role in a context of political insecurity, eventually protecting
middle class rights through the exercise of abstract review. The court, in short, created its
own demand.
Understanding these moves probably requires a synthetic approach that involves
both institutional and cultural accounts, nicely demonstrated in Diana Kapiszewski’s
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chapter in the Cultures volume. Along with a detailed account of the institutional
structure of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal, she examines actual practices as the
embodiment of institutional cultures. A key element is confidence, which is reinforced by
formal institutional stability and values of consistency. The role the court has articulated
for itself has involved mediating interbranch disputes and consideration of national
economic policies, but not considering many rights cases. Kapiszewski provides a useful
framework for thinking about what roles courts play when, one that integrates ideas and
institutions.
Catalina Smulovitz’s chapter on Argentina in the Cultures book poses a challenge
to the overall framework of the book. She argues for the primacy of institutional reforms
and the strengthening of support structures for the courts. In particular, support structures
(Epp 1998) can help insulate a court from challenges by other actors.
One of the powerful themes to emerge from the Helmke-Rios volume, explored in
the chapter by Helmke and Staton is that attacks on courts are frequent in Latin America.
Some of these attacks may themselves reflect democratic consolidation; an example are
Chilean attempts to get rid of Pinochet-era judges. Other attacks, such as those in the neoBolivarian states, may reflect the rise of populist movements bent on social
transformation. The puzzle, as Helmke and Staton identify it, is that attacks do not always
lead to acquiescence. Indeed, it is interesting that judges may have provoked
counterattacks by wading into politically treacherous territory. Whereas the first Russian
constitutional tribunal analyzed by Trochev was operating in an environment of
institutional uncertainty, courts in Latin America have a long history to provide them
information on likely outcomes. Helmke and Staton propose a formal model that goes
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beyond the typical strategic approach in that it is multi-period and emphasizes uncertainty
over time. Their work provides one way of understanding how it is that courts can shape
their strategic environment, and also helps us understand why we observe political
clashes that at first blush would seem to be off the equilibrium path. They also provide
valuable insight into why formal institutional changes may have perverse effects: when
judges value their seats excessively, they may become too deferential, whereas when they
value policy output they may be too prone to provoke interbranch conflict. This paper
illustrates the payoff that can come from careful formal work that builds on earlier work
but helps resolve an ongoing puzzle. It also provides a nice complement to Trochev’s
finding that Russia’s various constitutional adjudication bodies frequently decided cases
without compliance.
At the same, time, the Helmke/Rios framework, contrasting rights and structure,
may be too broad-brush. The rise in socioeconomic rights in particular is an oft-noted
contribution of some of the courts in the region, in part reflecting the increase in the
menu of legal tools available for political struggle. Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution,
for example, provides standing for a set of political actors including parties, unions, and
NGOs. Other legal writs are used in this regard as well (Brewer-Carias 2009). Group
rights are the language of the Bolivarian constitutions as well, and there is a new
emphasis on indigenous rights. The use of rights and law to resolve distributive struggles
pervades Latin America.
Another area in which one sees particularly intense judicial involvement is
criminal procedure, which constitutes the legal apparatus of social control. Democracies
and dictatorships differ in their use of legal tools in this regard. Typically, judges have a
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much greater role in democracies than they do in dictatorships, in which prosecutors and
police operate with less judicial scrutiny. Judges asserting the need for greater judicial
oversight of criminal procedure are at once advancing their institutional self-interest
while ensuring conformity of the new regime with international standards.
Yet another “consolidation” function, quite particular to new democracies,
involves dealing with the legacy of the past. Where the old forces are not totally defeated
but retain a powerful position in politics, demands for transitional justice are likely to be
suppressed (and appropriately so, since pushing too hard can undo the democratic turn).
On the other hand, if the old forces are defeated, there will be significant demands for
coming to terms with the past, and this frequently, though not always, involves the legal
system.
There is a vast literature on lustration, judicial rehabilitation, truth commissions,
and retroactive justice. When courts and the legal process are involved, complex
technical issues arise involving, inter alia, the proscription on ex post facto law, statutes
of limitations, and command responsibility. Frequently the rule of law, as classically
defined, suffers when courts ignore legal formalities to hold accountable elements from
the past regime. Nevertheless, from a political rather than formalist perspective, such a
role can be helpful in furthering democratic consolidation and legitimation of the new
regime in the eyes of the victims of the past one (Lollini 2010; Skaar 2011).
xxIn short, scholars are using a variety of methodologies to understand the wide
range of roles of courts in democratic consolidation. My temporal account of the different
roles courts play over time through democratic transition suggests that the consolidation
function, in which courts work in support of various conceptions of democracy, is
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predominant. Scholars seem to be attracted to stories of judicial empowerment, and the
consolidation of democracy involves an expansion in judicial power and relevance, in a
wide range of arenas. The full effect of the positive literature is to put to rest the idea of
the countermajoritarian difficulty. Myriad judicial roles are consistent with vigorous
democratic governance, as judges both complement and supplement other political
institutions.
JUDICIAL IRRELEVANCE
A fourth possible role can also be observed. This is where the courts, for whatever
reason, remain on the sidelines without either supporting or hindering democratization.
The Chilean experience, so well presented in Hilbink’s longitudinal study, Judges
Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship, highlights a judiciary with a good deal
of formal independence that nevertheless acts in ways that seem complacent or otherwise
conservative. The Chilean courts have long been highly professionalized and
institutionalized. Yet they did little to restrain the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Nor
did they play much of a role in democratization, with the exception of a single decision of
the Constitutional Tribunal that decreed that Pinochet had to hold the election he
ultimately lost. The Chilean judges had internalized an ideology of “apoliticism” along
with a hierarchical, self-reproducing institutional structure that rendered judges
unequipped and disinclined to take stands in defense of liberal democratic principles
before, during, or after the authoritarian interlude. Nor have courts been particularly
effective enforcers of the policies put in place at the end of the Pinochet regime, failing to
strike down infringements on property rights as well (Couso 2003). This seems to be a
case where the courts were agents of neither the past nor the future. To be sure, after two
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decades they have recently begun to play a role in transitional justice, indicting General
Pinochet before his death in 2006, but overall, the story seems to have been one of
general irrelevance, at least until very recently.
Hilbink’s methodological approach focuses on ideational factors and an
institutional history that fetishized “apoliticism.” It is, in other words, about selfarticulated role conceptions of judges (see also Kapiszewski 2007). Judges were viewed
essentially as government agents whose job was to bolster a strong executive and avoid
“politics.” The problem was that politics was defined in a distinctive way, as anything
that challenged state authority. The mantra of avoiding politics has been the constant in
Chilean judicial history, but the apoliticism was one-sided. It really meant a conservatism
in both the small-c and large-C senses. The Chilean judges historically engaged in
“actively defending conservative values and interests but reverting to positivist and even
formalist reasoning in cases involving defendants of the ideological Left” (p. 77). This
gave judges a certain amount of autonomy, even during Pinochet’s dictatorship. Pinochet
even retained rules allowing constraint of government action, including writ of amparo
(habeas corpus) actions and new constitutional remedies, because the courts did little
with these tools.
A key point for Hilbink is her assertion that Chilean judges retained the same
conservative approach after the return to democracy. In this sense, her account
emphasizes the staying power of ideas, and their ability to inhibit judges from exercising
latent power that is available to them. In her 2007 book, she grapples with what appeared
to be a nascent trend to overturn some of the implicit and explicit amnesties that had been
offered to secure authoritarian exit, but argued that these were rather exceptional.
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However, as the regional trend toward judicial activism has picked up, Hilbink has had to
modify her position, though not her theoretical commitments. In the Helmke and RiosFigueroa volume (99), she and Javier Couso address what they call the “incipient
activism” of Chile’s judges. Couso and Hilbink argue that Chile is on the verge of
assuming the “full” role by adding rights adjudication to its portfolio of interbranch
dispute resolution (Couso and Hilbink 2011). No doubt the temporal dimension
highlighted in the introduction is important here. This is evidenced by an increasing
willingness to embrace international norms and to uphold fundamental rights. Even the
constitutional tribunal, a quiet institution for its first two decades, has become a central
player in politics.
The key factors they identify as contributing to this change are ideological and
institutional. Ideologically, regional trends toward greater prominence for rights-oriented
constitutional discourse have changed the views of Chile’s legal academy and thus its
judges. On the institutional side, the transfer to the constitutional court from the supreme
court of the recurso de inaplicibilidad, which allows lower courts and litigants to
challenge legislation for unconstitutionality, greatly expanded judicial standing and
caseload. Combined with the elimination from the constitutional court of designated seats
for supreme court justices, these reforms had the effect of empowering younger lowercourt judges and freeing them from the direct scrutiny of their superiors in the judicial
hierarchy. The result has been a sea change and a delayed but significant role for the
courts. Arguably this is a case of quietude during democratic consolidation, but
emergence of an empowered judiciary in the consolidated phase. As the authoritarian
interlude recedes in time, courts may be less fearful of ruling against government
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regimes. We have observed in several countries—chiefly Chile and Argentina—that
courts are willing to overturn prior amnesties once the democratic system is sufficiently
secure. In some sense, this requires simply extending the time frame under which to
examine judicialization.
The ideational frame may be less useful for explaining change, or for tracing
mechanisms of influence, than an institutional approach. For example, Couso and
Hilbink’s assertion that the environment changed and new ideas of constitutionalism
crept into the Chilean academy may be correct, but the causal mechanisms that link this
to increased judicialization would require tracing the training of specific judges and
connections with the academy. In short, the claim lacks the crispness one would normally
expect in a historical institutionalist account of a sharp disjuncture. The editors of
Cultures of Legality argue that because institutions are constructed and reconstructed by
behavior, we need to pay attention to ideas and to constructivist dynamics, and this is
surely true. But the theoretical issue is whether constructivism provides a better account
of observed phenomena, and in the case of institutional change it seems to face an uphill
struggle.
Judicial acquiescence, of course, can also result from strategic factors. Castagnela
and Pérez-Liñán, in the Helmke and Rios-Figueroa volume, describe the rise and fall of
judicial review in Bolivia. With the creation of a new Constitutional Tribunal in 1998,
conditions were ripe for activist review. Indeed, the new Tribunal began to challenge
government policies, but it was unable to overcome a legacy of public distrust for the
judiciary, rendering it (along with the Supreme Court) vulnerable to attacks by the new
administration of Evo Morales in 2005. Rather than packing the courts, the politicians
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simply encouraged resignations without new appointments. This political strategy was
facilitated by the presence of divided forces in the legislature, and illustrates that political
gridlock not only expands substantive space for judicial decision making, as in the
strategic model, but also can weaken judicial institutions when they need legislative
action to keep functioning. The upshot was in Bolivia a constitutional reform with direct
election of judges, likely politicizing an office that is formally nonpartisan.
Trochev’s account of the Russian Constitutional Court after its reincarnation in
1995 is an example of a court that was relatively constrained by its semi-authoritarian
context. But since that time, it has gradually empowered itself. Trochev uses the
“zigzagging” metaphor to describe how Russia’s Constitutional Court has navigated a
treacherous and changing political environment, to generally expand its power. Trochev
would acknowledge that the power of the Court has been somewhat curtailed since his
study was completed in 2007. But in the 13-year period he examines, the Court
demonstrated an ability to navigate the political environment to expand its power. It
found implied powers of the president and legislative powers of the regions. On its own
accord, it expanded standing for local governments and the procurator general. It
demonstrated ample creativity as well, even as it has avoided the outright confrontations
that led to the death of the first Constitutional Court in 1993. Trochev emphasizes the
prudent political vision of the Court and its active role in the construction of ideas.
Covering as it does three different iterations of Russian constitutional adjudication,
Trochev’s volume provides a valuable longitudinal picture of an iterated interaction
between judges and political elites, and a framework for understanding subsequent
developments.
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ARTICULATING ROLES
How are we to understand how judicial roles are produced and articulated? There
are several lenses through which to view the choices judges make in determining their
role, which I characterize using the rubrics of space, ideas, and time. These correspond to
the major theoretical approaches in judicial politics: strategic, ideational, and historicalinstitutional. One set of accounts, known as the strategic approach, emphasizes
institutional context and the relationship with other political actors (Epstein and Knight
2000). This approach tends to look at the immediate politics of judicial decision making
as determined by the interaction of preferences among multiple actors and the position of
courts in the overall political system. This approach emphasizes political space rather
than time, as it tends to bracket longer-run temporal factors, and to set aside the
possibility that courts can shape their institutional environment over multiple interactions.
Instead, changes in the roles of courts over time tend to be seen as responses to
(relatively) exogenous changes to the strategic environment. For example, Helmke and
Rios show how court power expands with political fragmentation. The basic point is that
courts act within parameters, and the task of scholars is to explain how those parameters
both constrain and empower.
Ideas are the central emphasis of ideational accounts, in contrast with the strategic
account that tends to emphasize interests. Hilbink’s argument is a good example here, as
she argues that even strategically viable moves are constrained by ideological, cultural,
and cognitive limitations. Ideational accounts have great explanatory power in cases
when judges choose not to exploit all the discretionary space that they would seem to
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possess under a strategic analysis. Still, I have argued that they do not always provide
crisp understanding of the issues of temporality and change.
Time is the third lens through which to account for judicial politics. This is the
central concern of historical institutionalism, a leading approach to courts in the United
States. Whereas the strategic approach tends to look to judicial decisions in the context of
immediate political constraints, the historical institutionalists emphasize longer-run,
regime-type politics, and can integrate the role of ideas. The longer time horizons, and in
particular the notion of critical junctures in which contingency is heightened, are
particularly useful for understanding the changing roles of courts over time. The lens of
time is, I believe, particularly helpful for tackling the problem of how courts shape their
institutional environment, which is a central challenge for the other lenses.6
I have argued that roles can change over time, and that it is helpful to frame these
changing roles around the phases of democratization. A logical next step is to draw on
further longitudinal studies, akin to those of Hilbink and Trochev, to see whether it is
possible to generalize about the relationship among phases. For example, does a passive
role in the authoritarian phase increase or decrease the probability that judges will play a
vigorous role in democracy? Does it encourage a particular type of role, for example
focusing on interbranch conflicts? Do courts that act as triggers provoke a downstream
backlash even when they are successful? These questions are only suggestive of a
research agenda that takes time seriously.
My framing has implicitly assumed something of a linear progression toward
democracy. But we also have partial retrograde movements. What of courts in the
environments shaped by Bolivarianism, namely Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador? These
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countries continue a regional tradition of constitutional radicalism (Gargarella 2010) that
supports a more regime-supportive populist role by the courts themselves. Here the
Russian experience may prove more informative than the Chilean, at least for the
moment.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I identify four broad roles that courts can play in democratic
transition. Sometimes they serve as agents of the past, policing a transition or even
preserving policies of the authoritarian regime. Sometimes they act as agents of the
future, helping to transform the political process and encouraging the consolidation of
democracy. On rare occasions, courts trigger the democratization process itself,
encouraging mobilization and tipping the regime into transformation. These critical
junctures shape subsequent institutional structures and environments profoundly. Finally,
courts can be simply marginal players who neither facilitate nor hinder a transition to
democracy.
The next step in comparative judicial politics is to understand the interaction of
structure and agency, the ability of judges to shape their roles, and how that ability varies
according to institutional and environmental factors. I also offered three lenses through
which to understand judicial roles: those of space, ideas, and time. Each of these lenses
helps illuminate particular problems in understanding courts: the strategic approach to
political space emphasizes relationships with other actors and so is useful for analyzing
interactions; the ideational approach emphasizes the particular role-conception of judges
and their internal understandings of their job; and the historical-institutional approach
emphasizes the role of time, in some ways integrating the other two perspectives in a
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longitudinal framework. Naturally these are not pure categories, and much of the work
discussed here seeks to utilize mixed methodologies depending on the particular problem
at hand.7
Understanding the interaction of courts with other organizations in the political
space, as in the strategic perspective, has provided important insights into the latent
capacity of courts to contribute to democratic politics. Yet it does little to explain
instances in which courts do not exercise that capacity, as in Hilbink’s account of Chile.
In this regard, ideas seem to be important. At the same time, a constructivist account of
why courts exercise the roles they do, when they do, may not be sufficiently fine grained
to predict the precise scope of issues in which courts are involved. Here, tracing the
evolution of courts in one context over time, as do Trochev and Meierhenrich, may be the
most promising approach in terms of understanding how courts shape their environment.
But it is only through the aggregation of several such longitudinal accounts that we will
be able to emerge with generalized theories about how courts shape their environments.
What we do have so far is a rich array of accounts of judicial power ebbing and flowing
over time, in an increasingly diverse range of contexts outside the core of industrialized
democracies.
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No doubt there are many others that could be added to the list. My intention in this

review essay is to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, and to highlight certain themes
that are common to the broader literature.
2

Note that theories that tie political fragmentation to judicial empowerment do not really

apply directly in authoritarian settings, and so we should not be surprised by the
weakness of this commission. Compare Trochev (2008, 61).
3

Parenthetically, the ouctome for the Court itself was less than ideal. Yushchenko

himself proceeded to try to control the judiciary through appointments and the
manipulation of jurisdiction; a similar effort was undertaken in Georgia after the Rose
Revolution (Trochev forthcoming). The story illustrates how a particular role at one stage
may not carry over to the next; indeed, too much independence in the authoritarian period
might lead new democratic leaders to impose more constraints on the court downstream.
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The Harding and Nicholson volume contains chapters on the constitutional courts of

Korea (Ginsburg), Indonesia (Hendrianto), and Thailand (Harding).
5

On the United States, see Martin and Quinn (2002).

6

The question of whether and how judges have shaped their strategic environment is a

key issue in debates over the judicial politics in the European Union. See Carruba, Gabel,
and Hankla (2008) and Stone Sweet and Brunnel (2010). I contrast my categorization
with that of Couso et al., who characterize historical institutionalism as a static approach
(p. 13).
7

Relatively absent from the literature is the attitudinal approach that is so dominant in the

study of American courts. See, however, Amaral-Garcia, Garoupa, and Grembi (2009) on
Portugal and Garoupa, Grembi, and Lin (2011) on Taiwan.
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